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Abstract—This paper introduces for the first time a framework
to obtain provable worst-case guarantees for neural network
performance, using learning for optimal power flow (OPF) prob-
lems as a guiding example. Neural networks have the potential
to substantially reduce the computing time of OPF solutions.
However, the lack of guarantees for their worst-case performance
remains a major barrier for their adoption in practice. This
work aims to remove this barrier. We formulate mixed-integer
linear programs to obtain worst-case guarantees for neural
network predictions related to (i) maximum constraint violations,
(ii) maximum distances between predicted and optimal decision
variables, and (iii) maximum sub-optimality. We demonstrate our
methods on a range of PGLib-OPF networks up to 300 buses.
We show that the worst-case guarantees can be up to one order
of magnitude larger than the empirical lower bounds calculated
with conventional methods. More importantly, we show that the
worst-case predictions appear at the boundaries of the training
input domain, and we demonstrate how we can systematically
reduce the worst-case guarantees by training on a larger input
domain than the domain they are evaluated on.
Index Terms—Neural networks, mixed-integer linear program-
ming, optimal power flow.
I. INTRODUCTION
The optimal power flow (OPF) problem is an essential
tool for electricity markets, for power system operation, and
planning [1]. In its standard form, the OPF minimizes an
objective function (e.g. generation cost) subject to the power
flow equations and the operational constraints (e.g. line limits).
As the non-linear AC power flow equations render the AC-
OPF problem non-convex [2], the linear DC-OPF approxi-
mation is often used instead [3]. The substantial increase of
uncertainty in generation and demand requires to solve OPF
repeatedly and closer to real-time, in order to analyze a large
number of scenarios; this leads to significant computational
challenges [4]. Neural networks present a promising alternative
to conventional optimization solvers, achieving a speed-up
of several orders of magnitude [5]–[9]. However, the lack
of any guarantees related to the neural network performance
presents a major barrier towards their application in safety-
critical systems. In this work, we introduce for the first time a
framework to obtain worst-case guarantees for neural networks
which predict solutions to DC-OPF problems.
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Machine learning including neural networks have been
applied to a range of power system applications over the
past three decades; for a recent survey please refer to [10].
The focus of this work is on obtaining guarantees for ma-
chine learning approaches such as the ones in [5]–[9], which
predict solutions to OPF problems and replace the use of
conventional optimization solvers. These approaches can result
to larger computational speed-ups compared to predicting
inactive constraints [11] or warm-start points [12] that could
accelerate conventional optimization solvers. The work in
[5] trains neural networks to directly predict the solution to
DC-OPF problems, achieving a speed-up of two orders of
magnitude (i.e., 100 times faster). The same authors extend
this framework to include security constraints in [6]. The work
in [13] proposes an off-line algorithm to identify the sets
of active constraints and, based on these, directly computes
solutions to DC-OPF problems on-line. The work in [7]
extends this approach to neural networks predicting the active
set. The work in [8] demonstrates that both the approaches
in [5] and [13] can fail to predict feasible solutions, i.e.,
solutions satisfying the power system constraints, and proposes
an alternative training procedure to improve the feasibility of
the obtained predictions. Using neural networks, the work in
[9] directly predicts solutions to AC-OPF problems and relies
on a penalization of constraint violations during training to
improve feasibility.
While the works [5]–[9] report substantial computational
speed-ups and empirically analyse accuracy and feasibility, no
guarantees for the neural network performance are provided.
By evaluating the worst-case performance on the discrete
samples for the entire training and test dataset only an
empirical lower bound of the worst-case guarantee can be
obtained. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
first to introduce a framework that obtains exact worst-case
guarantees over the entire input domain, for neural networks
predicting solutions to DC-OPF problems. To this end, we
leverage recent advancements in evaluating the adversarial ro-
bustness of neural networks using mixed-integer programming
[14]–[16]. Our previous work [16] focused on power system
security assessment and provided performance guarantees for
classification neural networks. While these works [14]–[16]
focus on obtaining local robustness certificates that no adver-
sarial examples exist (i.e., input perturbations around a given
sample which lead to a wrong classification), in this work we
introduce a framework to obtain global worst-case guarantees
over the entire input domain. The main contributions of our
work are:
1) We introduce a framework to compute worst-case guar-
antees for (i) physical constraint violations, (ii) maxi-
mum distance between predicted and optimal decision
variables, and (iii) sub-optimality, leveraging mixed-
integer linear reformulations of neural networks.
2) We demonstrate our methodology on PGLib-OPF net-
works of up to 300 buses. We show (i) that the worst-
case guarantees over the entire input domain can be up
to an order of magnitude larger than the empirical lower
bounds obtained with conventional methods; and (ii)
that these worst-case guarantees can be systematically
reduced by training on a larger input domain than the
domain these neural networks are evaluated on.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section II,
we formulate the DC-OPF and its KarushKuhnTucker (KKT)
conditions, and explain the neural network architecture and
training to predict solutions to DC-OPF problems. In Sec-
tion III, leveraging mixed-integer reformulations of neural
networks, we introduce the framework to compute worst-case
guarantees. Section IV demonstrates our methodology on a
range of PGLib-OPF networks. Section V concludes. The code
to reproduce all simulation results is available online [17].
II. LEARNING DC-OPF WITH NEURAL NETWORKS
First, we state the DC-OPF problem and its KKT conditions
(which we will use at a later stage in Section III-C), and
then we detail the architecture and training process of neural
networks predicting solutions to DC-OPF problems.
A. DC Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF) Formulation
An electric power grid consists of an nb number of buses
(denoted with the set N ) and an nline number of lines (denoted
with the set L). Each line connects a bus i ∈ N to another
bus j ∈ N , (i, j) ∈ L. Set G (a subset of N ) collects the ng
number of buses that have a generator connected to them. The
vector pg of size ng denotes the generator active power output
and the matrix Mg of size nb×ng maps the generators to the
buses. A number nd of buses has a load connected to them.
The vector pd of size nd denotes the active power demands and
the matrix Md of size nb×nd maps the loads to the buses. In
the DC-OPF formulation, the voltage magnitudes are assumed
to be constant at all buses, and only the voltage angles θ of
size nb are included as variables. The DC-OPF problem can
be formulated as:
min
pg,θ
cTpg (1)
s.t. Mgpg −Mdpd = Bbusθ : λ (2)
pminline ≤ Blineθ ≤ p
max
line : µ
min
line ,µ
max
line (3)
pming ≤ pg ≤ p
max
g : µ
min
g ,µ
max
g (4)
The objective function in (1) minimizes the generation cost,
with a positive unique linear cost term c associated to each
pd
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the neural network architecture to predict the mapping
from the active power demand pd to the optimal generation pˆg: The neural
network consists ofK hidden layers withNk neurons each with k = 1, ...,K .
At each neuron of the hidden layers, a ReLU activation function is applied.
generator output. The nodal power balance in (2) ensures that
the power generation, power demand and in- and out-going
flows are balanced at each bus. The term Bbus defines the
bus admittance matrix, and the term Bline the line admittance
matrix. For brevity, refer to [3] for the full details. The active
power line flows in (3) are a function of the line admittance
matrix Bline and the voltage angles θ. We fix the voltage angle
corresponding to the slack bus θslack = 0 to remove the trivial
non-uniqueness of the obtained DC-OPF solution due to the
singularity of the bus admittance matrix Bbus. The physical
constraints comprise minimum and maximum limits on the
active line flow in (3) and the active power generation in (4),
respectively. Each constraint is associated with a dual variable,
denoted with λ for equality constraints and µ for inequality
constraints. The KKT conditions of the DC-OPF problem in
(1)–(4) can be written as:
c− µming + µ
max
g +M
T
g λ = 0 (5)
−BTlineµ
min
line +B
T
lineµ
max
line −Bbusλ = 0 (6)
µminline(p
min
line −Blineθ) = 0, µ
min
line(Blineθ − p
max
line ) = 0 (7)
µming (p
min
g − pg) = 0, µ
max
g (pg − p
max
g ) = 0 (8)
µming ≥ 0, µ
max
g ≥ 0,µ
min
line ≥ 0, µ
max
line ≥ 0 (9)
(2)− (4) (10)
The stationarity conditions are described in (5) and (6). The
complementary slackness conditions are enforced in (7) and
(8). The primal and dual feasibility corresponds to (10) and (9),
respectively. As the DC-OPF in (1)–(4) is a linear program,
satisfying the KKT conditions is necessary and sufficient for
optimality [18], given the DC-OPF problem is feasible.
B. Neural Network Architecture and Training
This subsection details the neural network architecture and
the training procedure in order to learn the mapping between
an instance of the power demand pd and the associated optimal
generation dispatch pg of the DC-OPF, see also (1)–(4). We
assume the power system topology is fixed, i.e., Bbus and Bline
remain constant, and the load domain pd ∈ D is restricted to
a convex polytope characterized by matrix Ad and vector bd:
Adpd ≤ bd (11)
On this load domain, we assume that the DC-OPF mapping
from system demand pd to the optimal generation dispatch pg
is unique, i.e., a singleton. It is shown in [19] that the DC-OPF
solution is unique almost surely in an appropriate space. This
is a requirement for the learning task as the neural network
predicts one optimal generation dispatch pˆg for the active
power demand input. The neural network architecture to learn
this mapping is illustrated in Fig. 1. The architecture comprises
a number K of fully-connected hidden layers, each of which
consists of a number of neurons Nk with k = 1, ...,K . The
neural network input vector is the active power demand pd and
the output vector is the prediction of the optimal generation
dispatch pˆg. Note that the entry of pˆg corresponding to the
slack bus (pˆg)
slack is not predicted by the neural network as
it is not an independent variable. The slack bus generation is
defined by the difference in predicted generation and demand:
(pˆg)
slack =
∑
i∈N
(Mdpd)
i −
∑
i∈G\slack
(pˆg)
i (12)
The superscripts are used to denote the corresponding entries
of the vectors. The input to the first and subsequent hidden
layers zˆk of the neural network is defined as:
zˆ1 =W1pd + b1 (13)
zˆk+1 =Wk+1zk + bk+1 ∀k = 1, ...,K − 1 (14)
The weight matrices Wk have dimensions Nk+1 × Nk and
the bias vector b has dimension Nk+1. Each neuron in the
hidden layer applies a non-linear activation function to the
input. In the following, we use the ReLU activation function,
which is used by the majority of neural network applications in
recent years, as it has been found to accelerate neural network
training [20]:
zik = max(zˆ
i
k, 0) ∀k = 1, ...,K ∀i = 1, ..., Nk (15)
The ReLU activation function in (15) outputs 0 if the input
is negative, otherwise it propagates the input. Note that the
max operator is applied element-wise to the vector zˆk . The
predicted generator dispatch of the neural network can be
evaluated as follows:
(pˆg)
nsg = WK+1zK + bK+1 (16)
The term (pˆg)
nsg denotes the ng − 1 entries of pˆg that do
not correspond to the slack bus. To train neural networks, the
first step is to create a dataset of demand instances pd ∈ D
and their corresponding optimal generation pg by e.g. using
historical data and simulation tools. The obtained dataset is
split into a training and test set. Then, during neural network
training, the weight matrices W and biases b are optimized
using stochastic gradient descent to minimize a loss function,
e.g. the mean squared error between the prediction pˆg and
the training dataset pg. In previous works (e.g. [5], [8]), the
performance of the trained neural network is evaluated on the
test set using statistical metrics such as accuracy or share
of feasible instances. This procedure does not provide any
guarantees related to the worst-case performance of the trained
neural network over the entire input domain pd ∈ D.
III. WORST-CASE GUARANTEES FOR NEURAL NETWORKS
We first state the mixed-integer reformulation of trained
neural networks and address issues related to scalability.
Then, we introduce our framework to compute worst-case
guarantees.
A. Mixed-Integer Reformulation of Trained Neural Networks
To include the trained neural network equations in an
optimization framework, we follow the work in [15] and
reformulate the maximum operator in the ReLU activations
(15) using binary variables bk ∈ {0, 1}Nk for all k = 1, ...,K
and suitable minimum and maximum bounds on the neuron
output zˆmin and zˆmax:
zik ≤ zˆ
i
k − zˆ
min,i
k (1− b
i
k) ∀k = 1, ...,K ∀i = 1, ..., Nk (17)
zik ≥ zˆ
i
k ∀k = 1, ...,K ∀i = 1, ..., Nk (18)
zik ≤ zˆ
max,i
k b
i
k ∀k = 1, ...,K ∀i = 1, ..., Nk (19)
zik ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, ...,K ∀i = 1, ..., Nk (20)
bk ∈ {0, 1}
Nk ∀k = 1, ...,K (21)
Observe that zˆik refers to the neuron (ReLU) input and z
i
k
to the neuron (ReLU) output. Note that the minimum and
maximum bounds on the neuron output zˆmin and zˆmax have
to be chosen large enough to not be binding and as small as
possible to facilitate tight bounds for the branch-and-bound
algorithm. In case the input to the i-th neuron in layer k is
zˆik ≤ 0 then the corresponding binary variable b
i
k is 0 and (19)
and (20) constrain the neuron output zik to 0. The constraints
in (17) and (18) are non-binding if zˆik < 0 holds. If the input
to the neuron is zˆik ≥ 0, then the binary variable is 1 and (17)
and (18) constrain the neuron output zik to the input zˆ
i
k. The
constraints in (19) and (20) are non-binding if zˆik > 0 holds.
As this reformulation introduces one binary variable for
each neuron in the hidden layers, we use a combination of the
works in [15] and [14] and employ three techniques to main-
tain scalability of the resulting mixed-integer linear programs
(MILPs). First, we sparsify the weight matrices W during
training, i.e., we gradually enforce a defined share of entries to
be zero. Second, we apply the concept of ReLU stability [14]:
All neurons for which the activation is always active or always
inactive on both the training and test set are fixed to this status
in the MILP reformulation, and the corresponding binaries
are eliminated. Third, we use several techniques to compute
increasingly tighter bounds zˆmin and zˆmax. We initialize the
bounds using interval arithmetic (for details see [15]). Then,
to compute tighter bounds, we minimize and maximize the
output of each neuron zik subject to the linear relaxation of
the trained neural network (13), (14), (16)–(21), and subject
to the restricted input domain in (11). Note that for the linear
relaxation only we relax the binary variables bk to continuous
variables between 0 and 1. Finally, we repeat this step using
the full MILP formulation of the trained neural networks. As
a result, we obtain tightened bounds zˆmin and zˆmax for the
branch-and-bound algorithm. Note that in the following, when
solving MILPs to obtain worst-case guarantees, we always
solve the full MILP formulation and do not use a relaxation.
B. Worst-Case Guarantees for Constraint Violations
The mixed-integer reformulation of trained neural networks
allows us to formulate optimization problems to obtain worst-
case guarantees for the physical constraint violation. We define
the maximum violation of the constraints on active generator
power νg in (4) and on active line flows νline in (3) as:
νg = max(pˆg − p
max
g ,p
min
g − pˆg,0) (22)
νline = max(|BlineB˜
−1
bus (Mgpˆg −Mdpd)
nsb| − pmaxline ,0) (23)
The term ‘nsb’ denotes all buses except the slack bus. To
compute the maximum constraint violation of the line flow in
(23), we compute the line flow based on the neural network
prediction pˆg and system loading pd. To this end, we remove
the column and row from the bus admittance matrix and invert
the resulting reduced bus admittance matrix B˜bus, inserting
(2) in (3). Note that the product BlineB˜
−1
bus is the well-known
“Power Transfer Distribution Factors” (PTDF) matrix; please
refer to [21] for more details. In both (22) and (23), we
take the overall non-negative maximum over the violations.
Note that we take the absolute value | · | of the line flow
in (23). In previous works, these metrics have only been
evaluated empirically on the datasets. Here, to compute the
worst-case generator constraint violation for the entire defined
input domain, we solve:
max
pˆg,pd,b,z,zˆ,νg
νg (24)
s.t. (11)− (14), (16), (17)− (21), (22) (25)
Similarly, to compute the maximum line constraint violation
νline, we maximize νline subject to (25), replacing (22) with
(23). As the input domain in (11) is a convex polytope and we
reformulate the max-operators in (22) and (23) using integer
variables, the optimization problem (24)–(25) can be cast as
MILP. If the MILP is solved to zero MILP gap, i.e., to global
optimality, then the bound is exact, and we obtain the provable
guarantee that no input pd ∈ D to the neural network exist
which will lead to constraint violations larger than the obtained
values of νg and νline. At the same time, the obtained values of
pd are the neural network inputs which lead to the maximum
constraint violations. If the MILP is solved to a non-zero
optimality gap, then we obtain an upper bound on the worst-
case violations νg and νline. If, additionally, the MILP solver
identifies a feasible solution, then the values of νg and νline
corresponding to the feasible solution serve as a lower bound
on the worst-case violations. Note that in the simulation results
in Section IV, we solve all MILPs to zero optimality gap.
C. Worst-Case Guarantees for Distance of Predicted to Opti-
mal Decision Variables and for Sub-Optimality
In the following, we formulate optimization problems to
obtain (i) worst-case guarantees for the maximum distance
between the predicted and the optimal decision variables νdist
and (ii) worst-case guarantees for the sub-optimality of the
cost function νopt resulting from the predicted solution:
νdist = max(|
|pˆg−pg|
pmaxg −p
min
g
|) (26)
νopt = c
T (pˆg − pg) (27)
The term pg denotes the optimal solution to the DC-OPF
problem for a given input loading pd. We normalize the
distance νdist element-wise by the corresponding generator
limits and compute the maximum over all generator set-points.
The distance νdist characterizes for the entire input domain
the largest mismatch of all generator set-points between the
prediction of the neural network and the ground-truth DC-
OPF solution. We formulate the following bi-level problem to
compute the worst-case distance νdist:
max
pˆg,pg,pd,b,z,zˆ,νdist
νdist (28)
s.t. (11)− (14), (16), (17)− (21), (26) (29)
pg ∈ argmin
pg,θ
{(1) s.t. (2)− (4)} (30)
The lower-level comprises the DC-OPF formulation and de-
fines the optimal generation pg as a function of the load
input pd. The upper-level problem maximizes the distance of
the predicted to the optimal solution of the DC-OPF for the
defined load input domain. We replace the lower-level problem
with its KKT conditions and rewrite the optimization problem:
max
pˆg,pg,pd,b,z,zˆ,νdist,θ,λ,µ
νdist (31)
s.t. (29), (5)− (10) (32)
By maximizing νopt in the the objective function and replacing
(26) with (27) we can compute worst-case guarantees for the
sub-optimality of the predicted solution. To achieve tractability
of this formulation, we reformulate the non-linear complemen-
tary slackness conditions (7) and (8) in (32) using the Fortuny-
Amat McCarl linearization [22]:
pminline −Blineθ ≥ −r
min
lineM
min
line , µ
min
line ≤(1− r
min
line)M
min
line (33)
Blineθ − p
max
line ≥ −r
max
lineM
max
line , µ
max
line ≤(1− r
max
line )M
max
line (34)
pming − pg ≥ −r
min
g M
min
g , µ
min
g ≤(1− r
min
g )M
min
g (35)
pg − p
max
g ≥ −r
max
g M
max
g , µ
max
g ≤(1− r
max
g )M
max
g (36)
This models the complementary slackness conditions with one
binary variable r and one large non-binding constant M for
each condition. Note that the constant M has to be chosen
sufficiently large to not be binding, while at the same time
small enough to maintain numerical well-conditioning of the
mixed-integer program. For details on bi-level programming
and this reformulation, please refer to [23]. The resulting opti-
mization problem is a MILP which includes integer variables
related to the reformulation of the neural network, and related
to the reformulation of the lower-level problem. If this MILP is
solved to zero MILP gap (and if constraint qualifications for
global optimality to the bi-level problem are satisfied [23]),
the bound is exact and we obtain the provable guarantee that
no input pd ∈ D exist with distances or sub-optimality larger
than the obtained values of νdist and νopt.
TABLE I
TEST CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Test cases nd ng nb nline Max. loading
case9 3 3 9 9 315.0 MW
case30 21 2 30 41 283.4 MW
case39 21 10 39 46 6254.2 MW
case57 42 4 57 80 1250.8 MW
case118 99 19 118 186 4242.0 MW
case162 113 12 162 284 7239.1 MW
case300 199 57 300 411 23525.9 MW
IV. SIMULATION & RESULTS
We demonstrate our methodology on a range of PGLib-OPF
networks v19.05 of up to 300 buses from [24]. The test case
characteristics are listed in Table I. The case9 is taken from
MATPOWER [25]. We assume that the input domain pd ∈ D
in (11) is defined as 0.6pmaxd ≤ pd ≤ 1.0p
max
d , i.e. each load
can fluctuate individually from 60% to 100% of its maximum
loading. Note that the maximum loading level pmaxd is defined
according to [24], [25], and the sum of the maximum loading
is shown in Table I. We did not consider loading levels
larger than 100% as we observed that this frequently leads
to infeasibility of the DC-OPF problem. This would require
load shedding and represents an abnormal system situation.
To create the datasets, we use Latin hypercube sampling [26],
draw 100’000 samples from the input domain D, and solve
a DC-OPF for each of the samples using MATPOWER [25]
to generate the corresponding optimal solutions. Out of these
input-output pairs we use 80% for training and 20% for testing.
The neural network architecture comprises three hidden
layers with 50 neurons each. As we will demonstrate (and
has also been shown in [8]), the size of this architecture is
sufficient to obtain low generalization errors of the neural
networks on the unseen test set. As described in Section III-A,
we sparsify the neural network during training by gradually
setting the smallest weight entries to zero until 80% of
the weight entries are zero; that means that only 20% of
weight entries are non-zero at the end of training. We use
TensorFlow [27] for neural network training with the following
specifications. During training, we minimize the mean squared
error between the neural network prediction and the true
optimal solutions. We define the maximum number of training
epochs to 250 and split the dataset into 2000 batches. We use
early stopping and we recover the neural network weights and
biases that achieved the lowest generalization error on the test
set. As the neural network training is highly non-linear, we
repeat the training and evaluation process 5 times, and report
averaged values for all simulation results. We formulate the
MILPs in YALMIP [28] and solve them using Gurobi. For the
Fortuny-Amat McCarl linearization in (33)–(36) we choose all
constants M to be 105. After solving the MILPs, we verify
that the complementary slackness conditions are satisfied and
the constants are non-binding. All computational experiments
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE AVERAGED OVER TEST SET SAMPLES
Test cases MAE νg νline νdist νopt
(%) (MW) (MW) (%) (%)
case9 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.04
case30 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.00
case39 0.07 0.71 1.02 0.30 0.00
case57 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.03 -0.01
case118 0.31 8.21 1.35 3.35 0.00
case162 0.61 9.11 2.07 4.08 0.01
case300 0.90 15.33 96.13 18.01 -0.02
are carried out on a laptop with i7-7820HQ CPU @2.90 GHz,
32 GB RAM and GeForce 940MX GPU. The code to repro-
duce all simulation results is available online [17].
A. Neural Network Performance
In the following, we evaluate the performance of the trained
neural networks with four metrics: The maximum generator
and line constraint violations νg, νline defined in (22) and (23),
the distance of the predicted to the optimal decision variables
νdist defined in (26),and the sub-optimality νopt defined in (27).
Note that we normalize the sub-optimality with respect to the
generation cost of the 100% loaded system state.
1) Performance Averaged over Test Set Samples: In Ta-
ble II, we show the performance of the trained neural networks
averaged over the unseen test dataset samples. The mean
absolute error (MAE) of the predicted generation dispatch
evaluates to less than 1% (normalized by the generator limits
as in (26)), indicating satisfactory generalization capability of
the neural networks. The averaged largest violation of active
generator and line limits are less than 0.5% of the total
maximum system loading in Table I. The averaged largest
distances of the predicted and optimal generator dispatch νdist
are less than 1% for the first four test cases, and increases
up to 18% for case300. Note that the latter corresponds to
the maximum over the vector pˆg of 57 predicted generator
set-points. The averaged sub-optimality νopt of the predicted
solutions is negligible. Note that the sub-optimality measure
can be negative if constraints are violated. The average per-
formance on the test set indicates satisfactory neural network
performance. In the following, however, we demonstrate that
the worst-case guarantees for these four metrics can be up to
two orders of magnitude larger than the average performance
on the test set (reported in Table I).
2) Worst-Case Guarantees for Constraint Violations: We
first compute the worst-case constraint violations on the entire
data set, i.e. on all training and test set samples. This serves
as an empirical lower bound on the worst-case guarantees.
Then, using the mixed-integer linear reformulation of the
trained neural networks, we solve the MILPs in (24)–(25) to
compute the corresponding worst-case guarantees. In Table III,
we compare the obtained empirical lower bounds with the
TABLE III
WORST-CASE GUARANTEES FOR PHYSICAL CONSTRAINT VIOLATIONS
Emp. lower bound Worst-case guarantee
Test cases νg νline νg νline
(MW) (MW) (MW) (ratio) (MW) (ratio)
case9 2.5 1.8 2.8 1.1x 1.9 1.1x
case30 1.7 0.6 3.6 2.1x 3.1 4.9x
case39 51.9 37.2 270.6 5.2x 120.0 3.2x
case57 4.2 0.0 23.7 5.6x 0.0 –
case118 149.4 15.6 997.8 6.7x 510.8 32.7x
case162 228.0 180.0 1563.3 6.9x 974.1 5.4x
case300 474.5 692.7 3658.5 7.7x 3449.3 5.0x
worst-case guarantees related to the violation of the generator
constraints νg and of the transmission line constraints νline.
First, we find that the worst-case guarantees for constraint
violations can be substantial. Table III shows the violations
in MW-values. In percentage, the violations are on average
8.1% and up to 23.5% (case118) of the maximum system
loading shown in Table I for each case. Second, the worst-
case guarantees are on average 6.7 times and up to 32.7 times
larger than the empirical lower bounds (the empirical lower
bounds are obtained by evaluating the worst-case performance
on the discrete samples of the entire training and test dataset;
if we only consider the test set, then the worst-case guaran-
tees are on average 255.2 times larger than the performance
shown in Table II). For the case57 system, we obtained a
certificate that no input inside the input domain exists which
can lead to a violation of the line constraints. Overall, these
findings highlight that by only considering the performance on
the dataset, the worst-case performance can be significantly
underestimated, posing a risk for real-time deployment if we
do not take appropriate mitigation measures. At the same time,
our framework allows to obtain a provable exact certificate on
the worst-case performance of neural networks.
By analyzing the solutions, we identified that for 18 out
of the 35 evaluations (5 neural networks trained for each test
case), the worst-case generator violation (νg) occurs for the
slack bus generator, as this generator has to compensate for the
mismatch in predicted generation and load. For the line limits,
the worst-case violations occurred on a line directly connected
to the slack bus for 24 out of the 35 evaluations. Averaged
over the 7 test cases and 5 runs for each test case, it takes
3.4 minutes to compute the tightened bounds for the mixed-
integer reformulation in (17) and (19), and 1.4 minutes to solve
both the MILP to zero MILP gap and compute the worst-
case guarantees. Based on the activation patterns on the entire
dataset, on average, 17.1% of the ReLU activations are fixed
to be active and 39.4% are fixed to be inactive for solving the
MILPs (as described in Section III-A about ReLU stability).
3) Worst-Case Guarantees for Distance of Predicted to
Optimal Decision Variables and for Sub-Optimality: In the
next step, in Table IV, for the same trained neural networks
TABLE IV
WORST-CASE GUARANTEES FOR (I) DISTANCE OF PREDICTED TO
OPTIMAL DECISION VARIABLES AND (II) SUB-OPTIMALITY
Emp. lower bound Worst-case guarantee
Test cases νdist νopt νdist νopt
(%) (%) (%) (ratio) (%) (ratio)
case9 1.2 3.3 1.4 1.2x 3.8 1.1x
case30 2.0 0.6 6.4 3.2x 2.5 3.8x
case39 6.2 0.6 64.4 10.4x 3.1 4.9x
case57 0.5 0.2 18.6 37.9x 1.8 8.1x
case118 35.0 0.2 265.7 7.6x 1.6 6.5x
and using the same procedure as in Table III, we compare the
obtained empirical lower bounds and worst-case guarantees
related to (i) the maximum distance between the predicted
and the optimal decision variables νdist and (ii) the sub-
optimality νopt. For these two metrics, we also observe that the
worst-case guarantees can be substantial; they are on average
8.5 times and up to 37.9 times larger than the empirical
lower bounds which are obtained by calculating the worst-case
neural network performance on the discrete dataset samples.
By analyzing the solutions for the metric νdist, we identified
that for 12 out of the 25 evaluations, the worst-case distance
between the neural network prediction and the optimal solution
occurs for the slack bus generator. For the first four test cases,
on average, it takes 0.3 minutes to solve both the MILPs to
zero MLIP gap. For the case118, the average computational
time increases to 25.6 minutes to solve both the MILPs
to compute νdist and νopt to zero MILP gap. Note that the
computational complexity increases as the KKT conditions of
the DC-OPF problem are included in (31) – (32). For the
case162 and case300, the MILPs could not be solved to a zero
MILP gap within 3 hours. Improving the tractability using
decomposition techniques and validating the satisfaction of
constraint qualifications for global optimality to the bi-level
program in (28) – (30) are subject of our future work [23].
4) Input Domain Reduction: In the following, we demon-
strate that the worst-case guarantees can be systematically
reduced by training on a larger input domain than the worst-
case guarantees are evaluated on. We achieve this by reducing
the input domain D with a term δ that can vary between 0.0
and 0.2: (0.6 + δ)pmaxd ≤ pd ≤ (1.0 − δ)p
max
d . For case39,
case57 and case118, Fig. 2 shows the worst-case guarantees
as a function of the input domain reduction δ. Note that the
values on y-axis are normalized to 100% with respect to the
worst-case values reported in Tables III and IV for the entire
initial input domain. First, we can observe that the inputs (i.e.,
the loading pd) which lead to the worst-case performance are
at the boundary of the input domain. Second, by increasing
the input domain reduction δ, the worst-case bounds can be
systematically reduced (e.g., for these three test cases, by
reducing each dimension by δ = 0.08, we can reduce all
worst-case guarantees to below 20% compared to the initial
domain). This implies that to reach an acceptable worst-case
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Fig. 2. The worst-case guarantees are shown as a function of the input
domain reduction δ for case39, case57 and case118. Note that the values
are normalized to 100% with respect to the worst-case values reported in
Tables III and IV for the entire initial input domain.
performance on a specified domain, the neural network can be
re-trained on a larger domain if the initial performance is not
satisfactory.
V. CONCLUSION
This work introduces for the first time a framework to
obtain worst-case guarantees for neural networks. As a guiding
example, we apply it to neural networks predicting DC-
OPF solutions. Our work addresses a major barrier which, if
removed, would enable the application of neural networks in
safety-critical systems. Leveraging mixed-integer linear refor-
mulations of trained neural networks, we can obtain worst-case
guarantees with respect to the maximum physical constraint vi-
olations, the maximum distance between the predicted and the
optimal decision variables, and the maximum sub-optimality.
For a range of PGLib-OPF networks up to 300 buses, we
show that the obtained worst-case guarantees can be up to one
order of magnitude larger than the empirical lower bounds (i.e.
computing the maximum of an error metric on the discrete
samples of the entire dataset). More importantly, we show
that the worst-case predictions appear on the boundaries of
the input domain used for training. As a result, the worst-
case guarantees can be systematically reduced by training
the neural network on a larger input domain, and applying
it on a subdomain. Future work is directed towards robust
neural network training and obtaining worst-case guarantees
for predicting solutions to AC-OPF problems.
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